

The

Philanthropist.

PUBLISHED BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE OHIO STATE ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY.

GAMALIEL BAILEY, JR., Editor.

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THE PHILANTHROPIST,
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For the Philanthropist,

"Dull sleep instructs, not sport vain dreams in vain."

NIGHT THOUGHTS.

In visions of the night
When leaden slumbers o'er the senses stole,
Met thought I saw a sight,
Which thrill'd with horror through my inmost soul.

It was of human forms,
Scorching beneath the burning eye of Day:
And passion's fiercer storms
Told, there oppression ruled with iron sway!

They stood in deep phalanx,
Huddled together like the very brute!
I gazed upon their ranks,
In sad and fix'd astonishment, and mute.

My heart, oppress with pain—
One groan escaped me from its deepest cells—
I wake to reason's reign,
It is no fiction—tis the truth she tells!

Reason, with deep revolt
Starts back to see her noble empire crush'd,
And sweet Humanity
Weeps o'er her fale! glory in the dust.

Spirit divine descend
And thy lost image to our world restore;
Till human hearts shall bind,
And sympathy its healing tide shall pour.

MAONA.

Cincinnati, Aug. 26, 1839.

COMMUNICATIONS.

MR. COCHRAN'S SPEECH.—LAW OF RIGHT.

DR. G. BAILEY:—I send you the following address by Mr. W. Cochran, one of the graduates at the last commencement at Oberlin. I can characterize it no better than to say that it is *condensed truth* on the subject of political duty in general, but especially the political duty of Abolitionists. I requested it for publication, as well satisfied that your readers would find much solid instruction in its perusal.

Yours, for the slave,

J. BLANCHARD.

N. B. Mr. Cochran expects to enter the field immediately as an Anti-Slavery Lecturer.

For the Philanthropist,
The Law of Right Paramount to Human Duties.

OSBURN C. INSTITUTE, Sept. 10, 1839.

By the law right I mean the rule in conformity with which moral agents ought to act. It is identical with the law of God, which as epitomized by our Saviour, requires us to esteem and treat every being according to his real worth—to enthrone God upon the supreme affections of our heart because he is an impersonation of infinite excellence, and to hold in as high estimation the rights and interests of our neighbors as our own, because they are equally valuable. Its claims extend to our entire being—to the thoughts and intents of the heart, as well as to external actions. By human enactments is meant municipal law, or a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state. It takes cognizance of external conduct alone, and its main design in its most perfect form is to appropriate sanctions to protect natural rights, and to afford facilities for their exercise. The question which I propose to discuss is not whether municipal law, in securing its objects, may not, under different circumstances, resort to different measures, and enjoin different courses of conduct *consistently* with the law of right. This is freely conceded. But it is, whether it can do *anything positively inconsistent* with the law of right, that is, enjoin what it prohibits, or prohibit what it enjoins. The simple fact that the law of right is God's law, and by himself declared to be immutable and eternal, ought to decide this question. But it is far otherwise. Many of our politicians deny its being from God, and trample under foot, as a rule of supererogation, every precept which crosses their inclinations; and the great mass though admitting its divine origin, yet deem it so yielding and flexible a nature as to bend like the responses of the oracle, to whatever interpretation their notions of *expediency* may demand, and in fact make it the mere slave of human legislation. These facts, while they are a sufficient apology for the discussion of a question already self evident, also make it necessary to establish the paramount authority of the law of right, by arguments the validity of which does not rest on revelation. This I shall attempt.

No one who has at all reflected upon the operations of his own mind can be ignorant of the fact that there are certain truths of invincible belief which rest on no other authority than the simple affirmation of his reason. Certain conditions are necessary to their development, but when their *utmost ratio* is demanded, no other can be given than that the mind is so constituted as to perceive them with absolute assurance of their truth. But, although incapable of direct demonstration, they are more plain and undeniable than any other, because they are the foundation on which all others rest. To deny others you have only to deny the validity of the reasoning on which they are based, but to deny these, you must deny the validity of your own faculties, which is to deny the possibility of all knowledge. Such are the axioms and principles of mathematics—such the affirmations that space is infinite, that duration is eternal and that every effect must have a cause. Such also, I unhesitatingly assert, is the affirmation that we ought to love God with all our powers, and our neighbor as ourself. An apprehension of the relations which we sustain to God and man is a condition indispensable to its development, but like the truths above referred to, its sole authority and its only ground is our mental constitution. Of course while this remains unchanged, that it should be altered is an absolute impossibility. Its continued affirmation is as necessary as its first. The only means I have of showing that such is the affirmation of reason, is to appeal to consciousness. Does not the law of right, with the characteristic of necessity ascribed to it, exist in your mind? Reverse it if you can. Convince yourself that

it be done, and Jotham's parable of the thistle and cedar of Lebanon, should no longer move our laughter, nor the silly remark of the clock-maker, that his time-piece regulated the sun.

Let us now suppose the opposite true—that human legislation can set it aside. By this, we are to understand that the claims of me law of right, yield to its counter claims, and are no longer obligatory; for surely no legislator, not even a friend, admitting its continuo claims, would have the heaven-dearing effrontry to enjoin a total disregard of them. This would be nothing short of a direct declaration of war on God. If this supposition necessarily involves consequences absurd and contradictory, it must be false, and the proposition which I am endeavoring to establish, true. There is no *tertium quid*; either human government *can* or *cannot* set aside the law of right. What then are the consequences involved? One manifestly is, that the standard of right, left us, is the will of demagogues or despots. For the supposition is, that their enactments however opposite to the claims of God's law are right. Of course, those claims for the time being cannot be right, unless contradiction can be right at the same time. Nor can they be the standard of right but that by which they have been determined to be wrong; viz. human legislation.

Another consequence is, that every law on the statute book of heaven can be erased, and in direct opposition enacted. For evidently, if human legislators have power to repeal any one part of the divine code, they have power to repeal any other, and consequently every other part; and if God has a single precept of his law left unerased, it must be a matter of grace on his part, and on his of thanksgiving. Nay, further, should he, impelled by a strong desire for the well-being of his subjects, solicit, on bended knee, the favor of executing his laws, even while urging his suit they could declare them all null and void, and seat the emperor of hell on his vacant throne!

Another consequence is, that all law and all legislation would be brought into contempt, and the bonds of society totally severed. If we could see no other reason for obeying law than the arbitrary will of despots, clearly nothing but force and fear could continue our obedience.

The very instant we judged ourselves to burst the chains confining our, limbs would be free—the next, perhaps, dropping with the gore of our oppressors, grasping for their fallen sceptre. Soon we must share their fate, and other tyrants mount dubious thrones based on sculls. The elements of sorrow, like those of the volcano, would be in ceaseless collision, and ever and anon their equilibrium being destroyed break forth in a wide-rolling flood of desolation. The earth itself must become one vast acedama. These consequences without adding to the list, show conclusively that the supposition necessitating them is false.

Here one two objections frequently urged by legislators occur to me, which may yet have some force in many minds. The first I notice, is based on the old adage, *circumstances alter casus.* This public good, say they, under different circumstances require the enactment of different laws. Hence a law, which at one time right may be wrong at another, and vice versa. This objection means one of two things, either that, under different circumstances, laws correspondingly different may be enacted consistently with the law of right which remains in force, or that the law of right itself may be changed. If the former, it is in perfect accordance with what I have already said, and admitted at the outset, if the latter, it has already been refuted; for it has been shown that to alter it, transcends the power of any being in the universe.

It is hard to say whether the folly or meanness couched in this objection urged with such seeming honesty, preponderate. By public good, is not meant the aggregated good of all the individuals comprising it, but of the parts to which it is applied.

To this I reply, 1st. That had mathematical

truths as much crossed the inclinations and passions of men they would unquestionably have been as generally despised.

In the nature of the case there is no reason why they should not.

The denial of the one involves that office agency or something else essential to our nature; that of the other could no more. 2d. It is word only and not in the intelligence that it is denied, is evident from the conduct of those who profess its denial.

The man who denies the existence of the external world, will demonstrate by his daily conduct that the law of right is not a necessary affirmation of reason, because many have denied its existence, and their obligations to conform to it, while truths that are really necessary, such as mathematical, cannot be denied.

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THE PHILANTHROPIST.

EDITED BY G. BAILEY, JR.

CINCINNATI:

Tuesday Morning, October 8, 1839.

AUDACIOUS.

The following version of the recent affair at Marion is taken from the *Painesville Telegraph*. Ordinarily courtesy to the civil authorities of Ohio should have taught the editor the impropriety of such an account, unless able to "vouch the accuracy." What more will these slave-eaters?"

They demanded the Black Law, and it was passed; and now, because in single instance it works unfavorably to their claims, they denounce our citizens as mobocrats, charge our judges with corruption, and with brazen audacity justify the violation of the sanctity of our courts of justice.

Riots in Marion co., Ohio.

The following article has been handed to us for publication. We know nothing of any of the parties, and of course can vouch for its correctness.—*Painesville Eagle*.

ABOLITION—DISGRACEFUL OUTRAGE.

A most disgraceful occurrence took place in Marion county, Ohio, a few days since, the particulars of which are as follows:—A negro, living in Marion, was arrested by his master and others in said county, and was taken before Judge Bowen, who allowed the negro forty days to prove himself free, he having taken the negro's evidence against several gentlemen, who swore to his being a slave of Mr. Van Bibber, (a). However, at the expiration of the forty days, Mr. Van Bibber returned with several witnesses, and a bill of sale from Mr. John Lewis, of whom he had purchased the negro.

The trial came on, and was attended by nearly the whole country, and a portion of the disgraceful affair (b) when the judge having heard the evidence which was conclusive to every impartial ear that the negro was a slave, (c) he determined not to give a verdict until next day at 8 o'clock, giving the mob, as he well knew, time to congregate. In the mean time, the Quakers of the place, having employed every lawyer to defend the negro. However, the Virginians succeeded in obtaining a lawyer, who advised them, should the judge release him as a free man, to take him before a magistrate for a new trial. Accordingly, when the judge decided the negro was free, [decision the partiality of which should be inferred] he, without any formal condemnation, then took him by the arms and addressed to him, but they were all knocked down by the mob, and most unmercifully beaten; and, to cap the climax, were by the civil authorities lodged in jail. Such proceedings should call forth the indignation of every patriot, for it must eventually end in the most lamentable consequences, if some active means are not taken to stop its progress.

(a) All this was according to the letter and spirit of the "Black Law."

(b) Why disgraceful? O, it was disgraceful, that gentlemen slaveholders should have to appear before an Ohio court, for kidnapping a resident of our state!

(c) It was not conclusive to the court—it was not conclusive to the citizens of Marion—but, it was conclusive to the "impartial" ears of Van Bibber, and his partners in crime.

THE MARION SLAVE CASE.

In connection with the above, we will say what we ought to have said, and intended to say, in relation to one part of the proceedings in the case of the colored man, William Mitchell, which took place a few weeks since at Marion in this state. The account states that the decision of Judge Bowen was, that Mitchell was not the slave of the claimants—and that during the subsequent affray and riot, he was persuaded to make his escape, and that he is "now probably beyond their reach."

Mitchell ought not to have left the place. There was no more necessity for it, after the claim had been decided against, than for any other of the citizens concerned fleeing the country—unless it be conceded, that our laws are powerless for the protection of those who live under them, when they are attempted to be trampled under foot by a band of insolent ruffians from the slave-states. Mitchell ought to have remained, and he ought to have been protected by the axis of the law. If he has not returned, he ought to return, and maintain his place as steadily as a king.

One thing more. The decision of any judge or magistrate in favor of liberty is final, as it is, when in favor of slavery. There is no provision made for an appeal or writ of error. Should Mitchell ever again be taken on the claim of the same parties, or any other deriving their pretended right through them, since the trial, it will be sufficient for him to plead the judgment once pronounced in his favor. And as the Court adjudicating his case is not *quod hoc* a Court of Record, it will be sufficient for him to prove the fact of his discharge by Judge Bowen, by oral testimony. We again say, he ought not to have been persuaded to fly—and that he ought to be persuaded to come back.

ONE ABOLITIONIST IN FAVOR OF HENRY CLAY.

The following extract is made from an article in the *Painesville Telegraph*, edited by an Abolitionist.

"Soon after another gentleman called, and without any threats, and a bold manliness that showed he was not ashamed of his errand, inquired directly if I intended to support Henry Clay, or be still to be maintained by the colored constituents. We answered, unhesitatingly, that if he should be fairly nominated the whig candidate, antagonist of Martin Van Buren, with any prospect of the party, we should vote for him, and use our best efforts in his behalf; but that we would not support him as a candidate of any local interest, with which we had sympathy.—We believe went away satisfied, whether we approved our answer or not."

We are at a loss for comment on so strange an avowal. The gentleman, masking it, is not a dough-face. So far as we can judge, it is independent and manly, in thought and speech. But, we affirm that he is no *abolitionist*. He may abhor Slavery, and avow his abhorrence. He may believe in the doctrine of immediate abolition, and declare his belief. He may speak against slavery as much as he chooses. Still, so long as he is unwilling to act against it, to the extent of his constitutional responsibilities, so long as he is willing to give his sanction to slaveholding, by supporting a slaveholder, and an inveterate enemy to human rights, he cannot be an *abolitionist*. Henry Clay has avowed his belief that Colonization is not adequate to the removal of slavery, and at the same time declared himself hostile to the emancipation of the slaves on the soil. Of course, he is in favor of perpetual slavery. He has thrown his influence in Kentucky against the advancing tide of liberal sentiment. It is the boast of his slavery-friends, that to him in great part was to be attributed the failure of a convention in that state. In his celebrated speech in Congress on Colonization, and in his late letter to his friends in Nansenmond, (Va.), he stands forth as the antagonist of free principles, and the fully devoted champion of slaveholding interests. If elected president, the world knows, that Henry Clay's power would be

exerted to confirm the system of slavery, check the diffusion of anti-slavery sentiment, and sustain in our foreign relations, the pretensions of slaveholders. And yet, for this man, the editor of the *Telegraph* will vote, and "in his behalf," use "his best exertions!" Our respected contemporary must bear with us, if, while we allow that he is whole-souled *whig*, we deny his claims to the infinitely more honorable title of an *Abolitionist*.

THE BLACK LAW.

The following from the *Painesville Telegraph*, speaks for itself. We rejoice that the people of Northern Ohio have so just an appreciation of state-honor, as to fix the brand of reprobation on the *scurvy* of last winter.

"We commend to the attention of all legislators and politicians, those who seek popularity, as well as those with whom the approbation of a good conscience is the desire, the fact, that thus far every member of the legislature from the Reserve, who voted for the infamous *black law* of last winter, has been dropped by common consent, while several of those who went against it, are nominated already for reelection. Told, senator from Trumbull, is the most popular man in the Reserve, that went for it, who can show me face them again, and only then can he not be received at this election. All parties in this region unite in condemnation of this law. The lesson is a good one for all truckling politicians.

POLITICAL ACTION.

Abolitionists on the Reserve are quite united on the subject of political action. We have most cheering news from that quarter. In most of the counties such candidates are put up as Abolitionists can consistently vote for. A correspondent writing to us, date Sept. 25th, says—"The Abolitionists in Ashtabula and Geauga, are determined, if Wade is east off for a pro-slavery man, that they will run him on their own hook, and if they do, they will elect him, as many Whigs of Ashtabula who are not Abolitionists, will vote for him."

We cannot withhold our approbation from the course of the *Ohio Star*, in relation to election matters. It has evinced a praiseworthy anxiety to preserve the Abolition voters of its party from imposition, and its counsel has doubtless had a beneficial influence. Although a Whig paper, it came out boldly a week or two since, announced the requirements of Abolitionists, and maintained their reasonableness. We hope our friends in Portage county will see to it, that a party-paper which thus dares to be independent, shall not fail for want of vigorous support.

We wish our friend of the *Painesville Telegraph* had found it in his heart to adopt a similar stand. He claims to be an Abolitionist, but it really seems to us indefensible, that he should subordinate Abolition to his party-preferences. We do not blame him for being a Whig, but we do blame him because he does not demand of his party a strict and uniform regard for the fundamental principles of civil liberty. That the grounds of our complaint may not be mistaken, we copy his remarks, made on the following resolution, passed at the Western Reserve Convention held at Painesville.

Resolved, That Abolitionists ought not, and that we will not vote for any man, for any legislative, or executive office, who is not heartily opposed to Slavery, and who will not openly meet and honestly sustain all constitutional measures calculated immediately to restore to the oppressed their rights.

The *Telegraph* remarks—

"As this resolution will be exceedingly grievous to our friends round about, who are so fearful that the whig party will be divided at the polls, we take the liberty to make a remark or two concerning it. There is a wide difference of opinion among those who call themselves and consider themselves abolitionists, concerning the proper rule of political action to be adopted at this time. There was even a difference of opinion in the convention:—although it is not strange that a body composed of "ultra" abolitionists, not in any offensive sense, but including those who have not been nominated, should be divided in their action of opposition.—There are other abolitionists, however, and we believe they compose the great body of those who are attached to the political parties of the day—who will judge for themselves when and how they should vote, in reference to that and all other interests in which their feelings are enlisted. There are many abolitionists, who are not more *abolitionists*, and who will not at present vote with reference to that question alone. Such we believe to be a vast majority of the whole. The property of such a course we have not time to discuss."

All this was equivalent to a license to party leaders to do whatsoever might please them. Its meaning was,—do what you choose—nominate just the men you like, whether they be hostile to Abolition or not—Abolitionists are too independent to be bound by the resolutions of conventions, —true, they think much of Abolitionism, but ten-fold more of Whigism. This was the plain meaning of the *Telegraph's* comments; and what followed? As an Abolitionist the editor was understood to speak the sentiments of his brethren, and so the Whig party, says the correspondent referred to above, "in Geauga county have brought forward men that are on the fence."

THE PAINESVILLE RESOLUTION.

Resolved, That Abolitionists ought not, and that we will not vote for any man, for any legislative, or executive office, who is not heartily opposed to Slavery; and who will not openly meet and honestly sustain all constitutional measures calculated immediately to restore to the oppressed their rights.

The above resolution was passed at a recent Anti-Slavery meeting at Painesville. We leave it with this remark. Whigs who would support or act upon such a resolution, are willing to endorse themselves to an ambitious Executive, in whose hands they would place the sword and the purse, together with his present almost irresistible patronage, barely to elect a man to an executive office, who can officially do absolutely nothing towards effecting the object. They would barter their dearest rights, for less than a mess of potage."

Let Martin Van Buren carry out his schemes of selfishness, he can sustain, aye, create slavery, by the mere force of an executive order.

Are they willing to become the slaves of power themselves, through a mere desire to allow their recognition of principles, when there is nothing in the act to advance those principles in the least?"

The foregoing is from the *Conneaut Gazette*, a Whig paper, opposed to slavery. The editor is one of that class of anti-slavery politicians, who are unwilling to do anything to purge out from their party, the leaven of pro-slavery. They hate Slavery, but they *hate* Van Burenism. They would be pleased to see the colored man restored to his rights; they would *exult* to see their political opponents despoiled of their power. With them, it is an object of more moment to keep out of office a sub-treasury man, than the owner of sixty head of human cattle.

Does the editor of the *Gazette* consider the pre-dicament in which he places himself by opposing the Painesville resolution? The resolution affirms, that Abolitionists "ought not to vote for any man for any legislative or executive office, who is not heartily opposed to Slavery, and who will not openly meet and honestly sustain all constitutional measures calculated immediately to restore to the oppressed their rights."

The *Gazette*, by opposing the Painesville resolution, is taken on the side of the *Black Law*, is nominated for the Senate. The two

candidates on the same ticket for the lower House, we doubt not, will do any thing, the slaveholder wishes.

As to the opposition ticket, we have but a word to say. We do not recognize on it the name of a single candidate for the legislature, who is entitled to the confidence of abolitionists. We hope our friends will scatter their votes, surely no man, be he abolitionist or not, let him concur with us or not as it regards the propriety of political action, if he have the smallest respect for humanity or state-honor, will vote for J. F. Garrison.

UNKIND.

A friend writes to us respecting our opposition to the Albany resolution.

"Last year I and every body admired your no-

ing this resolution, says virtually, that the honest men of the country *ought* to give their suffrages to candidates who may suit them in other respects, even though they should be in *favor of slavery*, and *hostile* to any measures calculated to "restore the oppressed to their rights!" The broad question of human rights is then a minor consideration with the *Gazette*; and in this republic, based on the doctrine of natural rights, deriving its existence from a revolution which appealed for its justification to the doctrine of natural rights, it is at length discovered, that it is entirely unimportant, whether our law makers and executive officers believe in this great doctrine or not!

The *Gazette* says, that Whigs who would support such a resolution, "are willing to enslave themselves to an ambitious executive," "barely to elect a man to an executive office, who can officially do absolutely nothing towards effecting the object." And yet, in the next paragraph he says—

"Let Martin Van Buren carry out his schemes of selfishness, and he can sustain, aye, create, slavery, by the mere force of an executive ukase."

How happens it, that the election of a man to the *Executive*, can so little concern human rights, when the same *Executive* "can sustain, aye, create slavery by the mere force of an executive ukase?"

The *Gazette* says, that the Executive can do a vast deal for, or against, slavery. By its appointing power, its patronage, its thousand agents throughout the Union, its influence on the press, its diplomacy, it can exert vast influence, for, or against, the slaveholding interest; so that the man is inexorable, who uses his influence to elevate to this office, a slaveholder, or friend of slavery. Such conduct brands him as an enemy to freedom.

The resolution of the *Painesville convention* commends itself to the common sense of every true American. What business has any man to hold office under a free government, who is not heartily a foe to slavery, and a friend to every constitutional measure calculated to effect its immediate extinction?

THE WESTERN RESERVE.

It gratifies us to learn that our friends on the Reserve generally, concur in the views we recently expressed with regard to the true basis of political action. A correspondent writing from Trumbull county, says—

"Most of the thinking friends say that you are on the right principle in relation to political action, and hope you will stick to and defend it. I think you will find the abolitionists of Ohio nearly unanimous in this, and if the doctrine is now properly illustrated, and defended, they will remain so. The people of this state have too much good sense to be taken in by such a *black law* of Ohio will be repealed at the coming session of the legislature."

The *Xenia Free Press* is also pleased to coincide with us in opinion. The *Painesville resolution*, quoted in another part of this paper, embraces, as we think, the true principle. Also in Lorain and Portage counties the *Albany resolution* has failed to obtain support. The following report of the Lorain county meeting we find in the *Oberlin Evangelist*.

"*ANTI-SLAVERY.*—On Commencement evening, the Lorain County Anti-Slavery Society met by adjournment at Oberlin. The meeting was large, probably more than one thousand people were in attendance. Mr. C. C. Burleigh, of Pennsylvania, addressed the Society for an hour and a half in his usual impressive manner, on the practicalities of abolition. After an address, following resolutions were passed, first in the Society, and then by the entire convention, no one voting in the negative in either case.—We hope no abolitionist will forget the principle of these resolutions in the excitement of the political campaign just now commenced. Let them abide firm, and the disgraceful "black law" of Ohio will be repealed at the coming session of the legislature."

Resolved, That we will not vote for any man for President or Vice President of the United States, or Congress, who is not in favor of the immediate abolition of slavery, and of the abolition of the internal slave-trade, and who is not opposed to the admission of new slave states into the union.

Resolved, That we will not support any man for the Legislature of the state of Ohio who is not in favor of the all laws of said state which are founded on a distinction of color."

Such resolutions can be defended.

An attempt was made to re-pass the *Albany resolution* at the meeting of the Portage county society, but it failed.

The Clinton county society at its late meeting, also sanctioned the principles we have advocated.

We note these facts, not for the sake of getting up a controversy on the subject, but that our Eastern friends may be apprised of the decision of the *Telegraph's* comments; and what followed? As an Abolitionist the editor was understood to speak the sentiments of his brethren, and so the Whig party, says the correspondent referred to above, "in Geauga county have brought forward men that are on the fence."

It may be proper to remark, that the refusal to concur with the views of the *Albany Convention*, has not been accompanied by any relaxation of effort in a political way on the part of abolitionists.

On the contrary, we think, that among our friends in this state, there is a more general and inflexible determination than ever, to carry their principles

of all the *black law* of Ohio will be repealed at the coming session of the legislature.

It would be a bold manness, to say that the *black law* of Ohio will be repealed at the coming session of the legislature.

It is the *black law* of Ohio will be repealed at the coming session of the legislature.

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It is the *black law*

ciple and his eloquent appeals added very much to the interest of the occasion.

I have to leave myself immediately, and have made arrangements to have this and a full copy of proceedings sent on to you as soon as possible. I have to attend county meetings for Ashtabula, Trumbull and Geauga counties next week, and shall send you a full report.

In behalf of the oppressed, yours truly,

L. D. BUTTS.

CANDIDATES.—In Ashtabula, Lorain, Medina and Trumbull counties, the candidates of the Whig party, so far as we can learn, are abolitionists. In Portage and Cuyahoga, the same party has put up such men as abolitionists can consistently vote for. Our correspondent on the Reserve informed us, that the Whig candidates in Geauga were fence-men. May be so. One of the candidates, however, for the lower house, voted on the right side of every test-question which came up during the last session, involving anti-slavery. We allude to Seabury Ford. We rejoice to see that abolitionists in Ashtabula and Geauga have acted like men. The free-souled Wade is again re-nominated for the Senate. The way in which such candidates have been secured, has been simple. Abolitionists have taken an active part in the doing of the party, to which they belonged, and avowed their determination, *seasonably*. The necessity of questioning in the counties named has thus been avoided.

CLERMONT COUNTY.—Col. Utter and T. J. Buchanan, are re-nominated this year by the Democratic party in Clermont county, the former for the Senate, the latter for the lower House. Their prospects of re-election are considerably jeopardized by an opposition ticket. These men of Black Law-memory have been busy in holding meetings, and explaining to their fellow-citizens their past course, "especially on the fugitive law passed at the last session." They are anxious to convince the people, that, after all, this law is in fact better for the slave, than former ones, and that those who compassionate the "wanderer," need apprehend nothing from its penalties!

NOTICE.

A District Convention will be held, Wednesday the 16th of October, commencing at 10 o'clock, A. M., in the neighborhood of Hanover, Jefferson co., (Ia.) for the purpose of organizing a County Society. The lecturing agents and all others friendly to the cause, are invited to attend, as subjects of great interest will be discussed.

JUNO.

CLEVELAND MEETING.

Don't forget the Cleveland Meeting on the 23d of October. It is the first meeting of the Parent society in this state; let it be well attended. We hope those societies that have not appointed delegates will appoint them immediately. The Portage county society has commissioned thirty delegates. Mr. Morris and Mr. Boyle from this city, it is expected, will be present. There will be also a considerable representation from New York city, including Mr. Birney who is now in Cincinnati.

THE CAPTURED AFRICANS.

The Circuit Court at Hartford decided on the 20th Sept., that it had no jurisdiction with regard to the criminal charge against the Africans of the Amistad. The following is an extract from the report of the trial.

"Judge Thompson addressed the jury at some length, and stated distinctly that with regard to the criminal charge against the prisoners, although he would offer no opinion whether they had or had not committed any crime, he must state that neither the court nor any other court of the United States, nor the grand jury, had any jurisdiction. The Amistad, he said, had been a Spanish coasting vessel, and a crime committed on board of her was the same, with regard to jurisdiction, as if the crime had been committed on the island of Cuba. In order to give a court of the United States jurisdiction, the crime alleged must be against some law of the United States, or the laws of nations. This is not a new question. The Supreme Court of the United States has determined that they have no jurisdiction over offences committed aboard foreign vessels. The court of one country will not execute the penal laws of another country. The vessel is a part of the foreign territorial jurisdiction. The judge here referred to the case of U. S. vs. Palmer. Could the case in hand be considered as an offence against the laws of nations, it would be otherwise. But in this case, if it should turn out that the vessel had been committed, this court has no jurisdiction. The jury therefore cannot find an indictment. The grand and petit juries, having no other business, were therefore discharged. The bills of indictment, therefore, prepared with great care, by the District Attorney, and laid before the grand jury, charging Jinguia with murder, and some of his comrades with piracy, &c., are ignored."

Prisoners having been brought before the court on a writ of habeas corpus, Judge Thompson, on the 23d, gave his final decision, that the circuit court could not discharge them under said writ. We subjoin a copy of the decision.

DECISION OF JUDGE THOMPSON.

On the opening of the Circuit Court, Monday Sept. 23d, Judge Thompson gave his decision with respect to the application of the prisoners' counsel, to have the Africans discharged under the writ of habeas corpus—and denied the motion. He said the question before the Court was simply as to the jurisdiction of the District Court over this subject matter. He regretted that the case had not been held up for further consideration, and that he had so little opportunity to examine the various important questions that are involved in it, with that thoroughness and deliberation that was desirable. He regretted this, the more, as there was a very peculiar and complicated one. It was one also difficult to be understood by the public. He could not be insensible to the fact that the feelings of the community were deeply involved in the question, and he found there might be misapprehensions of the real questions to be disposed of by the Court. It is possible, he said, that there may be some misapprehension. He would therefore have preferred that time should have been allowed for him to give a correcter opinion. But as the counsel have thought it advisable, he did not say it was not excusable, to call upon the Court to dispose of the case now, he was compelled, though much against his wishes, to dispose of it in the best way he could.

The question to be decided now is not as to the ultimate rights of either party—but it is whether the District Court can take cognizance of the subject matter that grows out of this case. In order to ascertain this, we must recur to the laws of the United States. The case has been placed before the Court on the abstract question. It is sufficient to say that the Constitution of the United States, although the term slavery is not used, and the laws

of the United States do recognize the right of one man to have the control of the labor of another man. The laws of the country are founded upon this principle. They recognize this kind of right. Whatever private motives the Court may have, or whatever may be their feelings, on this subject, they are not to be brought into view in deciding upon this question. They must give the same construction to the laws of the land, sitting in this State, as they would be sitting in Virginia. It is the province and the duty of the court to determine what the laws are, and not what it might be desirable they should be. My feelings, said Judge Thompson, are personally as abhorrent to the system of slavery, as those of any man here, but I must on my oath, pronounce what the laws are on this subject. The true question then is as to the law, and not as to any of the questions involved in the case. The simple question to determine is as to the right of the District Court of Connection to take cognizance of the matter.

Under the laws of the United States all seizures in a District are to be taken notice of in that District when the seizures are made. The important question is always as to the place of seizures, and the question always turns upon that; if a seizure is made within the limits of a State the jurisdiction of the District Court is local, if it is made on the high seas, in any District Court may take recognition of the matter. Where then was the seizure made in this case? It seems to be agreed by the counsel on both sides that the seizure was actually made in the District of New York. If that be the case this District Court has no jurisdiction of it whatever. But if the seizure was in fact made on the high seas this District Court has jurisdiction. Judge T. said he had supposed, at first, that the seizure was in fact made in the District of New York, but when he came to examine the papers he found it was not so. Lieut. Gedney, in his letter, states no such thing. He says he was on a survey within the State of New York, but he does not say that he actually discovered the schooner Amistad within that District, and that he made the seizure within the District of New York. All the evidence before the court is what is asserted in the letter. The vessel, it seems, was taken off Montauk Point. The Grand Jury, in their statement, say, it was a mile distant from the shore. If this be correct, it was a seizure upon the high seas, and therefore the master is rightfully before the Court for this District.

In the absence of absolute certainty on the case, the court has endeavored to ascertain, from the best evidence in their reach, by examining maps and charts, the locality of the place; and after making such an examination, they are of opinion that the actual place of seizure does not appear to be within the jurisdiction of the District Court of N. York, but upon the high seas. The Admiralty jurisdiction upon the ocean extends to low water mark. Between high and low water mark there is alternate jurisdiction between the admiralty and common law courts. In deciding, then, that the seizure was made in the judgment of the court, upon the high seas,—if either party is dissatisfied, the court can institute inquiry to ascertain the exact place, but the more regular course is for the party dissatisfied to interpose a plea to the jurisdiction of the court, and then the District Court must institute an inquiry to ascertain where the seizure was made. It is not competent then for this court, at the present time, to say the District Court has no jurisdiction in the case. Consequently this court cannot now pass decision upon the question as to the property—that matter belongs to the District Court. Should either party be dissatisfied with the decision of that court, an appeal can be taken to the Circuit Court, and afterwards to the Supreme Court of the United States. Meantime the parties must be put to their pleas in the District Court, in order that all the facts, &c., may be put upon record.

It has been said that this is a question of LIBERTY, and therefore that this court ought to decide the case in a summary and prompt manner. But in the judgment of the court, this ought to have no influence in the decision. The situation of the prisoners is such that they must be taken care of by somebody. They did not come here voluntarily. It is not the case therefore of persons coming here of their own accord, and being taken up by other persons against their will. If the District Court has jurisdiction of the schooner, they have jurisdiction of the persons of these Africans, and they are bound to provide necessities for them. They can provide for them as well as any other persons. The case seems to have been argued on the part of the prisoners as if they ought to be discharged, if the court had no jurisdiction. This is not so. It should be decided that the District Court here has no jurisdiction, they can decide also that the cause be submitted to the District Court of New York. The court would, in that case, send the vessel and cargo, and every thing appertaining, to that court. The prisoners would not be discharged, but sent also to the District Court of New York. No benefit would arise to them in being removed from this to another District. It is therefore a matter of no consequence to the prisoners, whether the question is tried here or in the District of New York.

It has been said that the subsequent proceedings in filing these libels and claims here, were without authority. But if the case is within the jurisdiction of the District Court, other libels could be filed. It is true that if original libels have been filed in order to bring the matter within the jurisdiction of this Court, the proceedings may be irregular. If there is any irregularity, it can be corrected by filing a new libel, the case being in the possession of the District Court; however, it is bound to receive claims of any body. This Court cannot decide whether these Spaniards have a right to these persons, or whether they should be put in the possession of the President of the U. S. These questions are not now regularly before the court. They must come up hereafter, and the court must dispose of them. The courts of the U. S. have taken cognizance of cases analogous to this. The question of jurisdiction is a preliminary question, and the court should not decide questions of abstract right. The courts of the United States have been taking cognizance of cases, where foreigners claimed the persons of slaves; but this is the first instance where a writ of habeas corpus has been applied for, and therefore there are no items that throw light upon the subject. It has never been made a question whether they were instantly free on being brought into the United States. The case of the Antelope is directly in point. The Spanish and Portuguese consuls claimed these subjects as property—the court said they must show their title.

There may be an impression here, that because slavery is not tolerated in Connecticut, that the right of these Spaniards should not be investigated. The court, however, must be governed by the laws of the United States, and not by the laws of the state of Connecticut. Our form of government recognized the right to import slaves up to the year 1808. It is true the Constitution does not use that language, but it recognizes the right to a certain period, and declares that till then it was a lawful importation. The Constitution also provides for the recovery of persons who may escape from one state into another, where service is due. It goes even beyond this, and interdicts the states from passing laws that oppose claimants from taking fugitive persons in the free states. Should any state pass such laws, they would be absolutely void. We must look at things as they are. The court feel bound, therefore, to say, that there is no ground upon which they can entertain the motion under the writ of habeas corpus.

The fear that some misapprehension exists in the public mind as to the effect and ground on which the case had been disposed of by the Grand

jury, upon the directions of the court. The question now disposed of has not been affected by what previously took place. The only matter settled previously was, that there had been no criminal offence cognizable by the courts of the United States. If the offence of murder had been committed on board a foreign vessel with a foreign crew, and with foreign papers, this is not an offence against the laws of the United States. It is an offence against the laws of the country to which the vessel belonged. The courts of the United States have, in such cases, no jurisdiction—but if the offence be against the laws of nations, this court would have jurisdiction. A murder committed, as in the case of the captain of the Amistad, is not a crime against the laws of nations—was the crime piracy even, it would not be a crime against the laws of nations, connected as it is with the slave-trade.

The court said that as they perceived there were note-takers present, they hoped they would be careful to make a true representation of the decision. The court does not undertake to decide that these parties have no right to their freedom, but leave that matter in litigation in the District Court, subject to appeal. And for reasons assigned, deny this motion.

One of the counsel for the prisoners then asked the court if they meant to express the opinion that a foreigner coming here with a slave can call upon the U. S. courts to enforce the claim of the foreigner to the slave. Judge Starkson, in reply, said he did not wish to decide now upon the district question. As a judge, he did not feel called upon to decide it. The court was then adjourned, sine die.

The District Court was opened. The judge said he should direct that the U. S. Attorney should repair to Montauk Point, in the Revenue Cutter, with a gentleman on the other side, to investigate the facts, ascertain where the seizure was actually made, &c.; that the court would be adjourned to meet in this city on the third Tuesday in November next. And that in the mean time it would be the duty of the Marshall to see that the prisoners were comfortably situated, and provided with clothes suited to the season, that they had prepared sufficient food, medical attendance, &c. The court would, it is presumed, allow the prisoners to be discharged on giving bail, but as it must be an *appraiser*, their counsel would not consent to it. The prisoners will probably be remanded to the jail in New Haven.

KIDNAPPING.—Two men, citizens of Massachusetts, named, *Perley Shearer* and *Dickerson Shearer*, not long since kidnapped a colored lad in Worcester, and carried him to Virginia. Dickerson Shearer, arriving at Fredericksburg, passed the boy as his slave, and sold him, it is feared, to a trader. His story was so absurd, as to create suspicion and lead to his arrest, as a kidnapper; and the mayor of Fredericksburg immediately wrote to the Postmaster at Worcester, making inquiries respecting Shearer's statement. His letter concludes as follows.

"All that humanity requires will be done here to recover the unfortunate boy. A messenger will be despatched to-night in pursuit, and the constituted authorities invoked to aid him. This man is in custody, but cannot be long detained without evidence. You will therefore reply by return of mail, and let the statements be made on oath, and let the person to identify be sent immediately. I am sir, respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

BENJAMIN CLARK, Mayor."

Two messengers have accordingly been despatched from Worcester to Fredericksburg. It is to be hoped that the boy may be recovered, and the villain duly punished. The penalty in Virginia for kidnapping is death by hanging; in Massachusetts not so severe.

The Mayor of Fredericksburg has acted in a manner highly creditable to his humanity.

EFFECTS OF SLAVERY.—We cut the following from an exchange paper.

"**A**—At a late census of the white population of South Carolina shows an increase of only 6,236, within the last ten years, which, remarks the Charleston Courier, is perhaps more than was to have been expected, considering the exhausting progress of emigration to which we have been subject for the last ten years."

Such is the effect of slavery. Kentucky is suffering greatly from the same kind of emigration.—The Frankfort Commonwealth says:—

"In a short visit to the country, we were charmed with the beauty of the fields, woods and pastures, and the countless comforts with which this goodly land abounds. It seemed to us that if there was in the whole earth a region wherein man might pitch his tent and feel no more the desire of change, that country was the Elkhorn region. But even here, where all can gratify the eye, please the taste or cheer the heart has been concentrated, the restless spirit of emigration prevails. The roads are filled with movers who are going to the West with the hope of adding thereby to their sum of happiness. Thousands on thousands are journeying to the frontiers of Missouri, taking with them their cattle, and herds, and money, prepared to make new homes in what is now comparatively a wilderness. The emigration this year is of the very bone and marrow of our land, and will be hailed in Missouri as a grand acquisition to her power and resources. Seeing it is so, but in reality it is sapping the very foundations of her prosperity."

The Commonwealth traces clearly enough the process by which this evil is to result.

The Kentuckians who go out this fall, and have been going for several years past, are what are called full handed men. They go from the grazing and agricultural districts of the State, and one of their chief causes for emigrating is, that they may have larger farms. They sell out their farms here for various prices—ranging between fifty and one hundred dollars per acre, and all this is to be invested in new lands at \$1.25 per acre. The result is, that the man who only owned a hundred acres in Kentucky, becomes the proprietor of thousands in Missouri, and not many years will elapse before that State will be occupied by the largest landed proprietors in the Union. A few families will own entire counties. The consequence will be, a sparse population—overgrown fortresses—national weakness. Missouri in her turn will mourn her depopulated regions, and feel all its bitterness, the patriotic lamentation of the Irish bard—

"Princes or Lords may flourish or may fade—
A breath can make them as a breath can make.
But a bold peasant—their country's pride,
When once destroyed can never be supplied."

These ills will probably last for a century—at least until there is a reflux from the Pacific ocean—the only boundary to Western emigration.—The Territories to the North of Missouri will better prospects; for the emigration to the west comes from the great workshop of nations whose habit is to fill the hive with honey before the new swarms are driven out—they people as they go.

"These ills will last" no longer, than their parent—slavery.

From Portage Co. A. S. S. Circular.

If this circular falls into the hands of the officer of a township Anti-Slavery Society, or into the hands of a private member, in either case it is hoped that he will immediately take measures to have his society become auxiliary to the county Society, and forthwith forward a report to the corresponding Secretary.

THE FRIENDS OF THE SLAVE IN PORTAGE COUNTY.

In the name of suffering humanity we appeal to you—in the name of the God of the poor and the oppressed, we entreat you, reader, be you male or female, to put forth at once a decided effort for the poor slave. You profess to feel for your suffering kind, as bound with them. You profess to have your heart's best feelings stirred in behalf of husbands and wives, fathers and mothers, and their helpless offspring, whose groans and cries are rising every hour to Heaven—and will you not put forth an effort in their behalf?—What are your professions, your sympathies worth, without decisive, substantial action? The cause of the poor slave languishes criminally, even in this country. If no more is done elsewhere than is here done, he must remain in bonds forever. This should not, must not be so.

Read, we entreat you, our annual report, contained in this circular, and apply yourself at once to the work.—See that a township, or school district Circulating Library, or both, are speedily provided for. Act for the poor slave, as you would have him act; in his stead—act for him, so that upon your dying bed you can look upon what you have done with joy. Use the means and the ability which a good and all-wise God has given you, to promote this glorious enterprise, which has such decided claims upon Christian philanthropy and benevolence, and He will still further bless you in basket and in store.

We hope and trust that this appeal will not be in vain. *Act, and act now.* A crisis in the Anti-Slavery movement has arrived—to relax now, loses all—to persevere a little longer, secures the success of the enterprise—the oppressed shall go free—millions shall be brought into the glorious liberty of the gospel—God's name shall be glorified—and our beloved country saved from dreadful and impending judgments.

Individual effort is needed—all can do something—reader, you can do something either by your means as God has blessed you, or by personal effort, or by both—we trust you will do something, and the beneficial results of your labors and efforts will not only be felt now, but they will be known in eternity, where we must soon meet at God's bar, these poor objects of our sympathy. *Act, act, ACT,* while the day lasts, for to-morrow nothing.

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The PHILANTHROPIST.—This publication languishes for want of support. This is wrong, it is an able and worthy co-laborer in the cause, and ought to be supported. It is worthy of the confidence and support of all. We cannot think it advisable to start a new paper in Cleveland, as is projected, while those which we already have, have given for want of support. Immediate efforts ought to be made on the part of abolitionists, and anti-slavery societies, to extend the circulation of the Philanthropist. This will be one important means of helping on the work. Will not some active individual in every township take hold of this matter?—

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The ANNUAL MEETING OF THE PORTAGE CO. A. S. SOCIETY.

Tuesday, Sept. 10, 1839. *Half past 10 o'clock, A. M.*

Pursuant to notice of the annual meeting of the Portage County Anti-Slavery Society convened at Ravenna. The meeting being called to order by the President, was opened with prayer by the Rev. S. W. Burnett, of Franklin.

On motion, a committee on business was appointed, consisting of A. Nash, G. Keen, T. E. Bottsford, S. Johnson, and H. L. Carter.

On motion, a committee to nominate a list of officers for the year ensuing was appointed, consisting of C. R. Clark, C. Clapp, H. Case, S. W. Burnett and T. Carnahan.

On motion, adjourned to 1 o'clock, P. M.

Met pursuant to adjournment. Meeting opened with prayer.</

